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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
REAL EsrrATE EXCHANGE,
A Corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MARK ALLEN KINGSTON and
DOROTHY KINGSTON,

Defendants.
STATEMENT OF F.&CTS
The statement of facts set forth in the plaintiff's
Brief iH substantially correct, except that it states that
the <lefendants declined to offer testimony. This is not
true. There was no reason for the defendants to introduce the testimony either of themselves or of their witnesses by reason o.f the fact that the Court granted a
Summary Judgment at the conclusion of the Plaintiff's
testimony. The testimony is accurate generally but is
inaccurate in that it omits the crucial factual points upon
which the Court predicated its Judgment.
The purchase contract, which was the subject of the
action, required the purchasers to make a payment of
$375.00 on or before the 26th day of August, 1964, and
$375.00 on the 26th day of each succeeding calendar
month. It further provided a 30-day grace period, Defendant's Exhibit 1. The pre-trial order stipulated that
the only payment received by the First Security Bank

wa~ in tht· amount ot $-1--1-3.00 and \\'hieh was (·n•d1t1·d 111
8eptember 28, 1964, Pretrial Order Crr. 71). The e:scru 11
was therefore delinquent from U1(~ datt• of ib irn'('1>tir1n

Plaintiff's agent \d10 con8mm1rnkd the <lPa\ 11 ;i,
aware that monthly paynwnts of $375.00 were n•quired
(Tr. 16-17). The property involved had a cafe, motel,
trailer units, and also sold groceries and beer. (Tr. 26-2i)
No effort was made by the plaintiff or plaintil'L
agent to investigate the credit of the purchasPrs. (Tr. l.j:
(Tr. 16) (Tr. 17) The plaintiff and his agent knew tlia:
the only business experience that the purchaser ha<l 1,1 a.,
that he was some kind of a singer and was familiar witl1
the surroundings which involved this purchase. (Tr. 2~1
This was confirmed by the purchaser himself who tP8tified that he worked at Hill Field and at one time had
worked in a service station for a period, and worked in
a grocery store for a period, neither in a managerial
capacity. (Tr. 61) The plaintiff was aware that ho.th the
Malloys were employed and their combined income was
approximately $10,000.00, but that one of them would
have to quit employment to run the business (Tr. 28 i
The plaintiff further realized that the only way that th1
purchasers would make the payments was out of th 1•
profits of the business. (Tr. 19) Also, they realized that
eve:n: 'though the sellers made a profit from the busines~
that did not prove the purchasers would make a similar
profit (Tr. 21). However, the plaintiff was willing tn
gamble that this would be done. (Tr. 22)
The plaintiff's Brief indicates the plaintiff advised
the defendants that they were working for both partie~
(Tr. 50), however, they did not tell the defendants that
in the event the sale was consummated they expected
2

POl:\T I

'l,HE COL:RT DID NU'r ERR IN lj,INDING 'l'HA'J'
'rHE PLAIN'rIFF DID NO'r OB'I1AIN AN ABL:Bj ANJJ
WILLING BUYER OF 'rHE PRDJMISE8 OF 'l11-IE
DEFENDAKTS
The facts and issues that have been stipulatPd Jw.
tween the parties are as follows: The plaintiff and drfon
dants entered into a contract wherein the plaintiff 1('(1s
hired by the defendants as n real estate agent fl) sell
certain real property situated in Morgan County, Ftul1.
The final tf•rms of the contract were differpnt from th1'
listing conditions, and an escrow was set up at the Firnt
Security Bank of Ogden, Utah. All of the papers involved
in this transaction were prepared by the plaintiff. Tlw
purchaser was required to make the first installment pay.
ment on the 26th day of August, 1964, although the
purchase contract provided for a 30-day grace period.
One payment was made; this was received by the
escrow agent September 28th, 1964, at a time when th1'
escrow agreement was in default. No. other payment was
made and the escrow was terminated and the papers returned to the defendants on the 4th day of Decembrr,
1964. At no time during the existence of the escrow agreement were the provisions of the purchase contract complied with by the purchasers.

It is well recognized and established law that before a
real estate broker can obtain a commission he must produce a buyer who is ready, willing and able to complete
the transaction.
12 American Jurisprudence 2d, Brokers, Section 183,
provides as follows :

4

f!rocitring

per~on

rnady, able, and willing to per-

(orm. As a general rule, under th~ ordinary undertaking of a broker, the broker is not entitled to
the compensation called for by his contract of
employment until he produces a person who is
ready, able, and willing both to accept and live up
to the terms offered by his principal. On the other
hand, and in the absence of any stipulation to the
contrary in the contract of employment, the broker is entitled to his commissions when he produces
such a person, notwithstanding that his employer
refuses to transact business with the person in
question.

12 American Jurisprudence 2d, Brokers, Sootion 184,
provides as follows :

What constitutes ability to perform. The cases
passing upon what constitutes abilty to perform
on the part of a proposed purchaser involve a
variety of circumstances, but it is clear in general
that the proposed purchaser must have the legal
capacity to purchase, in addition to having sufficient financial ability not only to make the initial
payment required to meet the terms of the seller,
but also to complete the contract of purchase according to its terms - that is, to meet any deferred payments.
Utah has rooognized this Rule for many years last
past.

The same rule is found in Corpus Juris Secwndum,
12. Brokers, Section 85, which provides as follows:
Each of the words "ready", "willing", and "able"
5

i.l1•a tl1at tl1t· 11ll1i·r:-; do Hilt e<1m·,.,,
All thret• of tht>s1· 1•lt•11wnts must t'Xi::;t in thP ,. 11 ~
tomer, in or<ll·r to Pntitle tlH· lirnkt·r to l1i:-; coJ 11

t•_\jll'Pss1·s an

missions. lt is not :mfficient that the custorne1
is ready and willing, hut he must also have t] 1p
ability to carry out the loan, salP, purchase, or
exchange; neither is it sufficient that he has the
ability to purchase; he must be ready and willin~
to do so; nor is it suffi<'ient that he is ablP, rr>ady,
and willing, but on terms differpnt from tliost
prescribed by the owner.
Where they have not been in controversy bt•tween
the vendor and purchaser, matters relating to tht
furnishing or showing of an abstract of title an
unimportant.
Tests of ability. Although the inability of a cu~
tomer may arise from legal incapacity, from lact
of title, in the case of an exchange, from encum
brances, in the case of a seller, or from lack ol
assent of his wife, where such assent is requirea
by contract, ordinarily the word "able" is used ii
connection with a purchaser or lessee, refers fo
his financial ability.
The Supreme Court of Utah has habitually and con
sistently recognized the rule theretofore set forth in tb~
following cases: Fritsch v Hess, Utah, 162 P. 70, 41
Utah 75; E. B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 137 P2d 342, lff
Utah 554; Lewis v. Dahl, 161 P2d 362, 168 Utah 48t
Hoyt v Wasatch Homes, Inc. 261 P2d 927, 1 Utah (2) ~
Curtis v Mortensen, 267 P. 2d, 237, 239, 1 Utah 2d 35;
and F.M.A. Financial Fund v Build, inc., 404 P2, 671
17 Utah 2d 80.
6
1

'J1lw trial Court Found:
In an alrno::;t identical case in Oregon, the Trial
Court found that the purchasers were not ready, willing

ur

ahle beeam;e they had neither the experience, know-

Jed•q: or fiHancial ability to purchase. The Supreme
( 'o~rt Con rt sm;tained the verdict in Martin v Clinton,

398 P2d 742, saying:
Plaintiff must show that the proposed purchasers
had the ability not only to make the down payment but the installment payments as well. There
was evidence from which the trial court could
have reasonably concluded that the prospective
purchasers would not be able to make the installJ iH::n i payments out of the operation of the restaurant and there was also reason to believe that
if tl1e purchasers eould not make the payments
from that source they might not be able to borrow
It
money
to meet the installments.
rt
It is difficult to find a case mC>re similar on the
facts and the law here as in the Oregon case. The trial
Court and the evidence clearly demonstrates that the purI~·
chaser
did not have the experience or knowledge to opercl
ate the property subsequent, and certainly lacked the
UI·
financial ability to purchase on the terms as set forth.
ol
The state of Kansas has reached a similar decision
·ea
in H iniger v Judy, 398 P2d 305. In that case the real
rn
&State broker sued to recover for the sale of a farm. The
t~
trial Court gave judgment fC>r the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed saying
on· that there was no competent evidence to sustain a findthi ing of the part of the broker.
4~
The general rule is that a real estate broker is
1m
entitled to a commission if (a) he produces a
481
buyer who is able, ready and willing to purchase
I~
upon the proffered terms C>r upon term accept351
able to the principal; (b) he is the efficient and
6111
procuring cause of a consummated deal. The
broker can recover a commission only if he sus7

tains the burden of proving that he has fulfil! 1.r[
each of these conditions.
Thus, it is the established law that the burden of
proving affirmatively that a purchaser is in fart readi•'
willing and able to make the purchase rests upon th~
plaintiff in this case. The plaintiff is bound by the r~
sults of his own testimony, and his testimony prowi
conclusively that although the purchaser that he ac
quired may in fact have been willing, he was neither l'<•ad!
or able to make the transaction. The admitted evidemt
indicated that the purchaser did not have the abilitv to
meet the contract payments and that he failed to do so
although they lost the real property they had tr an sferred
in lieu of a down payment. It is submitted upon the admitted facts that the plaintiff has a duty to affirmatively
prove the financial ability of the purchaser to pay the
installment contract. It alleged no facts at pretrial that
in any way contradicted the stipulated and agreed facts,
which shows conclusively an admitted financial inability
to perform nor did it produce proof at trial.
The only cases that plaintiff cites is a long line oi
California cases, which provides that an executed con·
tract conclusively presumes that a purchaser is ready,
willing and able. In so holding California has deviated
from the rule laid down by almost every other jurisdic·
tion in the United States. The Utah cases have nowhere
in any of the discussions contained therein adopted this
minority view nor have they at any time indicated an:
presumption conclusively or otherwise with regards to
this matter.
Counsel states that F.M ..A. FiMJneial Fund v Buikl,
Inc., 404 P2d 670,17 Utah 2d 80, is exactly in point

8

:\ 11

l'Xarnination indicates that the only real similarity

fJl't" een that case and the case at Bar is that there was

a purchase contract and that the purchaser sued for
i'('t·wission. !<~.M.A. Financial Fund v Build, Inc., the purr·liaser, was succ..essful in rescinding the contract. '11he rei'Ofd does not show that the purchaser at the time of
rxecution was not ready, willing and able to consummate
the deal. rrhe records do not indicate in any manner
that the purchaser lacked either the 'ability to pay or
the knowledge to successfully operate the property to be
purchased. It does not show that the realtor knew of these
defects or that the realtor was a double agent. The record
is devoid of any testimony that the purchasers defaulted.
In the case at Bar, however, the suit for rescission, was not
~nccf>ssful. The purchaser renounced any claim in or to
the prorwrty or for any rescission or for any other right
for the nuisance sum of $300.00, all of which he paid to
his attorney. On the other hand this record demonstrates
conclusively the complete inability of the purcha.Ser to
perform.
On this record, Furnd v Build, Inc., supra is not 1n
point and not applicable. The ruling of the trial court
was correct.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ElRR IN FINDING THAT
THE PLAINTIFF WAS AN UNDISCLOSED AGEN'T
FOR FEE FOR BOTH THE BUYERS AND SE.LLERS
IN SAID SUBJECT TRANSACTION.
The plaintiff again takes exception in his Brief to
the fact that the only evidence comes from the plaintiff.
He ignores the fact that upon the granting of a motion
9

for 8nnnnary .Jndgli1Pnt at th<' (•OJH·lttsion of pla nti1 1
easP that the defendants art> not rt-quested, expectrd
required to produce testimony. Again the plaintiff quotr
at length in his Brief in an attempt hy eompletely ig-nu:
ing the nub of the situation, mainly, that both partiP~ \Ht
at no time advised of the intent that the plaintiff wa,
going to collect a commission from hoth partiPs. 01t t\
contrary, the plaintiff's testimony, which binds th~u 1•
is that it did not so advise the defendants or eithPr 11:
them, because it was none of their business. It cornvleleh
ignores the fact that that Mrs. Kingston's husband, an:
co-owner of the property, was in Florida and that tht!
never at any time discussed any such arrangement·
with him and that his sole knowledge of the tran~
action was contained in the papers that were sent ti
him by the plaintiff.
,

1

11

Further, the plaintiff completely neglects or ignun·
setting forth any law to confirm his position. The
reason for that is there isn't any. The rule is set down i1
12 American Jurisprudence 2d, Section 172.
Effect of knowledge, consent or custom. The gen
eral rule that an agent of one o.f the parties !1
a sale or exchange of property may legally cnn
tract for compensation with the other party t
the transaction with the knowledge or consent o:
his principal applies to brokers. Except in a fe1
cases wherein it has heen held that in order !
entitle a broker to commission from both th1
buyer and seller there must be an express coi
tract by which the buyer and seller bind thern
selves to pay, the rule is that of both parties !
a transaction have knowledge that the broker ii
1

1

1

1

10

acting for tlwm both, and do Hot ohjt>ct, hut allow

him to so act and agree to pay him compensation,
thPy will be held to have assented to his acting
in a double capacity, provided he hai:; not fraudulently favored one at the expense of the other.

rl'he Utah Courts have fully recognized the above
rule and havP followed the same for many years. In Van
Lcl'uwen v Ihtffaker, 5 P.(2) 714, 78 Utah 521 the Court
harl occasion to discuss this precise problem:
The general rule is that a real estate broker employed to sell, purchase, or exchange property
for a specified commission, who, in effecting the
transaction, also reeceives a commission from the
other party, without disclosing that fact to his
principal, is not entitled to recover a commission
from his principal, especially where there is evidence that reliance was placed upon his judgment
and skill. McLure v Luke, 84 C.C.A. 1, 154 F.
647, 650, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 659, and note; 9 C.J.
568.
and again the Court held further :
The rule is based upon the doctrine that the duty
of an agent for a vendor is to sell the property at
the highest price; and of the agent of the purchaser, to buy it for the lowest. Farnsworth v.
Hemmer, 1 Allen (Mass.) 494, 79 Am. Dec. 756.
When the fact of such inconsistent relation is
either admitted or proved, the burden is then upon
the agent to show that both principals had knowledge and consented to his acting in such dual
capacity, and without such proof he is not entitled to recover compensation from either.
11

'l'his doctrine was re-affirmed as late as January, rn11,
by the Supreme Court in lVilkcrson v 8tcn~11s, 1;j i''La
2d 173, 397 P2d 983. Thus, it will be seen that not onh
did the plaintiff admit that the true extent of ihi du~!
relationship was never disclosed to the defendants but
on the contrary, the extent of that relationship was ex
pressly denied and hidden from the defendants. TJi,
plaintiff could not claim that it did what it concedes it
did not do. The claim of the plaintiff for commissioi
from either party is rendered uncollectable by publir
policy. The defendants could not agree to conditions 01
an agency when they did not know the extent of that
agency.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 'l'HM
PLAINTIFF HAD AGREED rro ACCEPT P AYME~'l
OF THE COMMISSION ourr OF THE MONTHLY
PAYMENTS MADE: IN ACCORDANCE TO THE
ES.CROW AGREEMENT AND THAT THE PURCHASERS MADE NO PAYMENT ON SAID CONTRACT EXCEPT AS HEREINBEFORE SET
FORTH.
It is quite correct that the defendants signed an
exclusive sales. agency contract with the plaintiff on
or about F e b r u a r y 15, 1964, however, the plain
tiff admitted that no purchaser of any kind was obtained
by it in conformity with the listing contract. Thereafter!
in July, 1964, an earnest money receipt and offer to pur·
chase was tendered by the ultimate purchasers. It w11.1
never executed, however, by the defendant Mark Kin~
ton and that proposal fell through because of the inability
of the proposed purchasers to obtain the down payment,
which was a part of their offer. Thereafter, the August

12

ap:rt•(•111ent was entered into upon terms substantially

diffrrent from that in the listing agreement. As the
plaintiff conceded there was no cash involved in the
transaction, it was fully aware that the defendants had
no money with which to pay any fee, so it offered
tlrn agreement and by including in all of the escrow documents a provision whereby the plaintiff would accept its
11ommission out of sales received from the buyers. It is
conceded that the plaintiff did not thereupon excute a
nrw eon tract with the defendants, however, it was aware
of the> fact that no deal could be made without th:s provision in it, and it so wrote all of the documents. The
completed deal, including the provisions for the payment
of any commissions without all monies received from
the purchasers, was then sent to the defendant Mark
Kingston in Florida and he executed the same.
It is significant to note that at no time did t4e plaintiff make any claims that it intended or desired to hold
the defendants to any other agreement. On the contrary,
the plaintiff prepared the agreement to sell with that
provision in it and remained mute. The plaintiff cannot
now repudiate its own acts and its own deeds and,
because of the default of the purchasers, nullify what
it knew to be an intricate part of Jhe contract whereby the defendants agreed to sell. The Supreme Court of
Utah in Mifflin v. Shiki, 293 Pl, 77 Utah 190 had before
it this precise problem, and the Court in finding against
the Broker stated:

The listing agreement was prepared by the plaintiff, on a printed form furnished by him. He testified that all the writing placed in the blanks was
written by him. In interpreting the contract, there-

13

fore, it must bt> constnwd most strongly agaill:
him. 13 C.P. 545.
It has long been recognized that a brokerage contrat
may provide for the payment of fees on special conili
tion. Thus, in 12 Am J ur 2d, Section 195 the rule is statei,
as follows:

Effect of special brokerage .(J;greements of co11.
ditiovns. Although in the conventional brokagf
transaction the broker does not assume the risk oi
nonpreformance by the parties to the transactiori
negotiated by the broker, the broker and his prin
cipal may vary this rule to any extent by makin1
payment of the commission dependent upon w
tain conditions or contingencies, such as a conru.
tion that payment of commissions is to depena
upon complete performance, consummation of the
transaction, transfer of title, payment of the pur.
chase price, or the like. When such stipulatiom
are made, a fulfilment or performance of the pre
scribed conditions is generally essential to !ht
right to compensation.
One of the special agreements or conditions upon
which the fee can be made contingent is the provision
calling for a payment out of the purchase price, or out ol
the installments made on the purchase price as was madr
herein. 12 Am J ur 2d, Section 196 states:
The broker's right to commission, under an agreement making such commission payable out of th~
purchase price, is, generally speaking, clear where
the sale is completed and the purchase price paia.
The cases have differed, however, as to whether
the broker may be entitled to a commission where

14

the cas<'S
lian' hPld or n~eognized that where a brokerage
eontract provides for payment of the commission
f rorn, or out of, the purchase price, the broker
is not entitled to commissions where either the
purchaser or the owner defaults.
1IH· :-::tip i:-: not ('Onsmnmatt>d. Souw of

rrhis rule again has been the rule in Utah since 1921.
In Watson v. Odell, 198 P. 772, 58 Utah 276, the Court
has hefore it a contest between the broker and the sellH for a coinmission, having therein a provision for
the ,naYment
of a commission out of installments. rrhe
.
Court found that because the installments were not paid
there was no obligation on the part of the seller.
The fact that a sale for a definite amount of money
is mentioned in the agreements of l\Ia:rch 7th and
May 10th indicates that no such cumbersome, conditional, and unenforceable contract as that of May
20th was in contemplation of the individual defendants when they signed the agreement of May 10,
1916. A sale is ordinarily understood to mean a
transfer of property for money. Pope, Legal Definitions, 1437. Ultimately the contract of May 10th,
if successfully consummated, would eventuate in
the :,receipt 1of money by the stockholders, but
nevertheless it is fanciful and far-fetched to speak
o.f the agreement as a sale. Assuming that plaintiff
was employed by the individual defendants by the
contract of May 10th, that, nevertheless, was not a
general employment. Both by the contract of
March 7th and the correlated agreement of May
10th his employment was special, on definite, special terms-a definite sale price of $260,000; a
15

<lefinitt> eommission of $30,000 payable pro rat
as the purchase price would be paid. No comn1i1

sion was payable except in the event of the cun
summation of a sale, and no commission was pay
able except as the purchase price was paid. The;
contracts required more from the plaintiff thar
merely to find purchasers able, willing, and read1
to buy. The actual payment of the purchase prit1
was required, and only as the purchase price wa,
paid were the commission installments due ani!
payable.

1

1

This decision was reiterated in Mifflin v. Shiki
supra. The most recent decision is that of Prince George',
Country Club, Inc., v. Edward R. Carr, Inc. MD. 202 A21i
354. Here there was a proposed sale of $1,300,000.00 ct
the assets of the corporation, which were substantially a~
of the assets. The plaintiff sued for a broker's commi1
sion. T.he Court found that the Vendor had agreed to pa:
the commission out of the proceeds made from the profit·
of the sale and that this was a condition precedent to thi
earning of a fee by the plaintiff.
The rule underlying the statute does not apply because the contract which the broker signed madP
the consummation of the sale a condition precedent
to the earning of the broker's commissions. Borow·
ski v. Meyers, 195 Md. 226, 232-233, 72 A.2d 70li
704, after reiterating the usual rule, held:
'On the other hand, a broker is not entitled !Q
commission if he has not completed the under
taking which he assumed. The essence of s
brokerage commission is that it is dependent
upon success, and that it is not dependent in

16

any way upon the amount of work done by the
broker. • • •
'80, where consummation of 1::. sale is dependent upon a condition, the principal's agreement to pay a commission to the broker is dependent upon the stipulated contingency; and
if the broker acquiesces in the arrangement,
and reasonable and bona fide efforts are
made by the principal to perform the condition, but the efforts are unsuccessful, the
broker is not entitled to a cmnmis~oirJn.'
The Court further concluded:
In the present case we think a condition precedent
was intended. The Club and the h::oker agreed
in terms that the provision as to commissions was
to constitute a condition. The condition was not
only that the commission was to be paid at the
time of settlement but that it was to be paid from
the $700,000 part of the purchase price, and the
necessary inference, we find, is that if there was
no such purchase price there was to be no comm1ss10n.

See also: Tant v. Gee, 348 Mo. 633, 154 8.W. 2d 745;
(!olvin v. Post Mortgage .and Land Company, 225 N.Y.
510, 122 N.E. 454.

The jurisdiction that the plaintiff relies upon to bail
him out on the first point, dynamites him on this point. In
Cardoza v. Moorehouse, 17 Cal. Rptr. 28, the Broker had
sut>d for his commission. The defendant claimed a modifieation of the agreement, however, the Court found that
17

COXCL1'SIOX
l n tl1i:-: appeal the trial court found three reasons to
,[.-t11'_1 tlw granting of a Smnrnary Judgment against the
i'la· 11tiff and in favor of the defendants. All of these rea,,111~ ,n_•n· conclusively supported by the evidence and
j, 1 tlic· Im,·, although it would only be necessary
ti1 i ind ow•, a :-:ufficient justification to uphold the trial
,.1,urt"s decision.
1

Thi· plaintiff herein sought to take advantage of the

;un:idY of the defendant wife and the absence of the de-

i1·ndant husband to consummate a contract and earn a
, u1n111i:-:sion. Having failed to convince the trial court
(1f 1Jw l<>gality of its desires to escape the consequences
(if its acts, it now requests this court to ignore the ulti111ate and material facts involved and award to it a new
trial for commissions that it never earned. It would have
tlii:.: Court do what the Supreme Court of Kansas r~
fused to do, to-wit: Ignore the admissions which the
plaintiff and its agents made, contrary to their interest.
It is submitted that justice and the law requires the uplinlding of a trial Court's decision.
Respectfully submitted,
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